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HEGEL ON THE BACCHANALIAN REVEL OF TRUTH 
 
Das Wahre ist ... der bacchantische Taumel, an dem kein Glied nicht trunken ist, 
und weil jedes, indem es sich absondert, ebenso unmittelbar aufloest, -- ist er 
ebenso die durchsichtige und einfache Ruhe. 
  
Truth is the bacchanalian revel in which an unintoxicated member is not to be 
found.  And since each member, insofar as it is separated, immediately dissolves 
it membership in the revel, the revel itself turns out to be a state of transparent and 
simple tranquility. 
 
 I would like in this paper to concentrate just on this one sentence, taken from the Preface 
to Hegel's 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit.  I think it captures very nicely the Hegelian view of 
truth which is a constant throughout his work.  In any case, it presents a rather unique 
epistemological position -- if we can call it that -- and requires some unpacking.  I might add that 
if you start off in the spirit of revelry, you will probably not be overly critical of this paper.... 
 First of all, I would like to draw you attention to the reference to Glied, "member."  This 
is an uncommon way of referring to participants in a festivity.  Could we speak of being a 
"member" of a TGIF party or a birthday party?  Granted, a revel is a somewhat larger operation 
than a mere party; but one might already suspect from the organic imagery here that Hegel has 
something special in mind. 
 Notice also the double negative: literally, "there is no unintoxicated member."  
Sometimes a double negative is used for deemphasis, as for example when someone wants to say 
that your joke was not really all that funny, they might say, "I am not unamused by your 
punning, but I'm very busy now...."  But here it is obviously used for emphasis:  to say that there 
is "no unintoxicated member" is to bring home the point that there are no exceptions -- everyone 
is drunk, really drunk. 
 The double negative leads into an oxymoron: a revel in ordinary parlance is about the 
furthest thing from a state of inactivity.  But here is is a state of quiescence: the revel as rest.  
Combined with the metaphorical allusion to truth in the first clause, it implies that the situation 
with regard to the truth -- can we say, the evolution of epistemology? -- in spite of appearances 
of continual movement and shifting, is a state of paradigmatic constancy and stability. 
 Notice, finally, a grammatical peculiarity:  aufloesen in German is a transitive verb, like 
"make," "force," "lift."  You can't just "dissolve" -- you have to dissolve something.  Hegel, 
although he went through the Preface just before his death with a fine-toothed comb, never 
corrected this mistake (if it was a mistake).  But one of Hegel's grammatical idiosycracies was 
the occasional omission of pronouns, auxiliary verbs, reflexives, etc.; and the editors of Hegel's 
works sometimes tried to supply omissions which disturbed grammatical integrity.  One editor 
suggested that the masculine pronoun, er, which would refer to the revel, should be added to this 
clause, so that we are to understand Hegel as saying the the revel dissolved each of its members.  
Another editor added sich after aufloest by way of interpretation.  According to this reading, 
each member dissolved itself; or, since reflexives in German sometimes are equivalent to the 
passive voice in English, Hegel might simply be saying that each member "is dissolved."  I think 
this latter interpretation is more likely.  That being said, let's return now to the first clause: 
 
 "Truth is the bacchanalian revel...." 
 
 This sounds strange to us because we usually think of truth as a relationship of the mind 
to reality or vice versa -- some kind of "fit" or "conformity" is implied. 
 For a scholastic realist, truth is the conformity of the mind to that which is external to the 
mind -- the thing.  But just any sort of thing?  Is it really important for the mind to conform to, 
and accurately reflect, hair and dirt and mucus, etc.?  To reflect these things in a one-on-one 
relationship would leave something to be desired.  Mucus, for example, is not worth much 
mental effort in itself; it only begins to make sense in the context of biological secretions, white 
blood corpuscles, immunity responses, the limits of immunity, etc.  Or -- turning from biological 
to sociological considerations -- a realist might characterize truth as the accurate depiction of the 
way things are in the community or the nation or the world.  But could anybody ever give an 
accurate deptiction without having knowledge of the totality?  Can there be bona fide truths 
isolated from the context of the whole?  And may not the "whole" also include some very 
subjective things -- notions, principles, perspectives, ideas and ideals? 
 The idealist perspective -- that truth is the conformity of the thing to the mind -- seems 
offhand to offer a more attainable kind of conformity.  If, like Kant, we hold that sense intuitions 
must be molded by the mind into spatial and temporal forms and that physical laws involve the 
application of a fixed number of conceptual categories to phenomena, then the conformity 
demanded by truth seems to consist in the proper and judicious use of twelve categories 
necessarily resulting from our logic and the various species of logical judgement.  But can I be 
sure that my own logical operations are uniform at all times?  that they are not affected by moods 
and emotions, and that they are never idiosyncratic?  And what if my categories do not jibe with 
those of others?  One does not have to be a Peircean to recognize that there is an inevitable 
communitarian aspect of truth. 
 It is not inconceivable that both realists and idealists might be willing to admit that the 
truth is only to be found in the overall context -- the objective context of the universe in its 
development, the subjective context of the multitude of consciousnesses in their development.  
But they might want to refer to this as "absolute" or "mystical" truth -- truth with a capital "T," 
probably unattainable, and in any case not the sort of truths that ordinary philosophers-in-the-
field should have to deal with.  This context, if we examine it further, is like an all-pervasive but 
intangible mood -- something like the revel itself.  For the revel, although it is not any concrete 
and determinate object that you can pinpoint, is there nevertheless; and you might even say that 
it's the most important factor of all -- like team spirit, or personal identity, or a friendly 
atmosphere, and other equally intangible factors. 
 
 "...at which an unintoxicated member is not to be found..." 
 
 Historians and theologians argue e.g. about when and where Jesus was born.  But surely 
the only really important thing is the religious significance of Jesus and his message, which 
should supply the context for such investigations.  Geometers can demonstrate that a2  + b2 = c2; 
but the human mind, confined to a diet of such "truth," will waste away.  The larger picture is 
required to put isolated and finite truths into perspective.  And this larger perspective, forming 
the horizons of our everyday knowledge, is provided by philosophy.  Philosophy is not just a 
luxury for the truth-seeker, Hegel insists.  He observes: 
 
 That which, even as regards content, in any given species of knowledge or 
science, is "truth" -- can only be worthy of such a name when it has been 
engendered through philosophy;... the other sciences, though they might prefer to 
pursue truth by ratiocination without the help of philosophy,....cannot, on their 
own, appropriate for themselves their life, their spirit, their truth. 
 
 Hegel in this respect joins the ranks of numerous philosophers who have regarded 
philosophy as the queen of the sciences, or the ultimate architectonic discipline, or the 
foundation for all empirical investigations.  But he avoids self-serving hype.  He cautions us that 
there is a lot of intellectual drunkenness going on among professional philosophers, who should 
be in the service of the truth.  Yon Thomist thinks that his principles of active and passive and 
possible intellect, esse and form, ens reale and ens intentionale, etc. he has the handle on reality.  
Yon Wittgensteinian believes he holds the Archimedean lever with his analysis of "family 
resemblances" of words, and envisions corps of uniformed philosophers patroling the boundaries 
of language to prevent speculative nonsense and pompous nostrums.  Yon Kantian comes 
equipped with his 12 categories and 3 formulations of the categorical imperative and 3 postulates 
of practical reason, ready to help human reason to work within its limits.   Yon deconstructionist 
appears out of nowhere with his non-methodical method of "dissemination," in order to generate 
"displacements" and to displace traditional binary "representations" with "differance."  Yon 
skeptic in the corner has is the melancholy member of the philosophical revel: the truth, he tells 
us, is that there is no truth; and he is quite as certain of this as any of the other participants.  And 
so it goes.  They are all drunk with their own version of the truth.  But this does not go on 
indefinitely, Hegel assures us: 
 
 ...and since each member, insofar as it is separated, immediately dissolves it 
membership in the revel,... 
 
 Each member, in other words, reaches its limit of intoxication, which is also the limit of 
its association with the revel.  It flls by the wayside in a drunken stupor, and the noise and the 
excitement of the revel fades away for it.  It has become "past history."  Is it possible for any 
philosophical position to escape this fate?  Hegel was certainly hoping that his philosophy would 
somehow learn from such mistakes, and avoid what seemed to be an inexorable fate. 
 Let's continue a bit further with the analogy of the revel:   What if one of the members 
retains his or her sobriety -- like the "designated driver" at a New Year's party, who has to 
remain sober to make sure no one at the party ends up on the road as a drunken driver.  If we 
apply this analogy to philosophy, this would mean not becoming intoxicated with one's own 
version of the truth.  This would imply also an ability to assess the viability of each of the other 
versions, with which the others tend to become intoxicated.  In the stron sense, it would imply 
developing a system of philosophy which explicitly takes into account the history of philosophy, 
and adopts whatever measure of truth is found in all the schools or systems.  In short, it is a 
combination of systematic philosophy with the history of philosophy -- a system of history which 
involves a history of systems.  With this in mind, Hegel observes: 
 
 A superficial surveillance...does not so easily see the differences among 
philosophical systems as the inexorable unfolding of the truth; but rather finds 
only contradiction amid such differences. But the bud disappears with the 
appearance of the blossom -- and one could say that the former "comes to be 
refuted" by the latter. And then again, with the advent of the fruit, the blossom 
itself proves to be a 'false' existence of the plant, and the fruit comes on the scene 
as the plant's 'truth' instead of the blossom. 
 
 Hegel, who rejected the possibility of physical evolution, nevertheless believed in a 
spiritual evolution which governed the immanent teleology of philosophical systems.  Ideally, 
the trustworthy and sober "designated driver" of philosophical systems would come into 
existence precisely at a time when the most mature modern systems of philosophy had supplied 
the intellectual apparatus necessary for the generation of this ultimate system, and an intellectual 
audience which would be amenable to its leadership.  This optimal time, in Hegel's estimation, 
had indeed arrived in his own day.  The outcome should be a new view and appreciation of the 
ongoing and ceaseless revel: 
 
 ...the revel itself turns out to be a state of transparent and simple tranquility. 
 
 The revel is a paradoxical state of affairs, like the "unmoved mover" of Aristotle.  Hegel 
characterizes it as a restless tranquility, an overarching stable conceptual atmosphere which 
instigates and inspires all the intoxicated particular revelries without being intoxicated or 
affected in any way by the excesses.  Philosophy for Hegel is essentially a movement towards 
the highest degrees of self-consciousness; and if we apply the analogy, Hegel is saying that 
philosophy, when all is said and done, is the calm and inexorable movement of Spirit inspiring 
mankind to become self-conscious about themselves and their place in the world.  Each isolated 
vision and version of the truth contributes to this movement in its own way.  But with each of the 
visions, the excitement eventually passes away.  Would Hegel's system also suffer the same fate?  
Maybe not.  If it were possible to capture the spirit of the revel itself, to tell the truth about this 
revel, possibly this would be to attain the calm stratosphere above the storm, which is not subject 
to the same laws of change and disappearance.  Hegel did set out to develop a system which 
would not be subject to the vulnerabilities of his predecessors; and part of his strategy was to 
incorporate all that was salvageable in previous philosophies in his own system, so that it would 
be no longer one-sided, and hence unbalanced and unstable.  He pursued this goal in both his 
Phenomenology of Spirit and in his later system of philosophy, but with different emphases.  In 
the Phenomenology, he attempted to reenact and reconstruct the stages in which the various 
visions of philosophical truth arise and reach their denoument, and thus in the process catch a 
glimpse of the truth of Spirit which is both instigating these developments, preserving all the 
elements of truth within them, and drawing them all together in a calm recollection.  In his later 
system (the Science of Logic, the Encycloedia of Philosophical Sciences, and the various 
extensions of this system) he tried to develop a philosophical Science in the strict Aristotelian 
sense of "science."  This tightly organized body of philosophical knowledge, having learnt its 
lesson about excesses and aberrations, explicity sets out to avoid one-sided presentations of the 
truth.  If it were successful (and this is still a matter of much dispute), it would approximate as 
closely as possible to the presentation of the truth of Spirit, which is the mainspring behind all 
the variant pursuits of truth.  If Hegel were successful in this enterprise, he would be like the 
"designated driver," refusing to join in the inebriation, and thus optimally qualified to drive the 
busload of hungover philosophers to their own chosen destinations.  If everything went 
according to plan, as he dropped off his passengers one by one, each one would begin raise their 
sights to the truth of self-consciousness advancing, willy nilly, through their efforts. 
